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Abstract 
Half a century of centrally planned policy in the Central and Eastern European countries 
resulted in outdated technologies, inefficient allocation of resources and low productivity. 
Following the end of communism there was a fifteen year process of transition which ended 
in 2004 with eight post-communist countries joining the European Union (EU) of which 
Poland was the largest. As part of the EU these countries now face the challenge of the 
common EU strategy Europe 2020, which has set the target of achieving R&D expenditure to 
GDP ratio (called the R&D intensity) of 3% by 2020 for the Union as a whole in an effort to 
increase the competitiveness of the region. Poland, like the other post-communist countries, 
faces a lower target of R&D intensity, set at 1.7%. Nevertheless, the challenge is immense, 
since the country is still at only half that level and has little experience in developing policies 
to help achieve it. In this paper we tested two possible policy options to achieve the target: (1) 
to increase government expenditures on R&D and; (2) to provide tax relief on R&D to 
businesses. The method applied to assess the options is a recursive dynamic computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model for Poland with an explicit link between productivity and 
R&D stock. The results show that achieving the R&D intensity target via the use of tax relief 
is 2.5 times more costly to the government budget, but it has a greater impact on the economy 
in terms of a higher GDP growth. Tax relief proved efficient in the short run while in the long 
run the government expenditure policy provides better value for money.   
Keywords: R&D policy, productivity spillovers, stock of knowledge, CGE model, 
macroeconomic effects, post-communist countries. 
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Half a century of central planning left the Central and Eastern European economies with 
outdated technologies and an inefficient allocation of resources. Following market reforms 
and structural changes during the 1990s, the situation in the region started to improve and in 
most countries significant productivity gains were observed (Kolasa, 2008). In 2004, eight ex-
communist Central European economies (CE-8) joined the European Union (EU), marking a 
symbolic end to their period of transition. Since accession, the CE-8 have had to contribute to 
wider EU development as outlined in a range of strategic plans. The current EU strategy, 
Europe 2020, emphasizes that research, development and innovation are key policy 
components of economic growth and sets an average 3% target for R&D intensity1 across the 
EU. In addition it establishes individual targets that each country has to meet so that the 
overall average is met (see Fig. 1). 
Longer term members of the EU and non-transition countries usually have higher levels 
of R&D intensity than the EU average and hence also higher targets in this area. For example, 
Finland and Sweden have been assigned a target of 4%. Many studies have been published on 
R&D policy in those highly developed countries showing a positive impact of R&D on 
competitiveness (see for example Blomström et. al., 2002) and the productivity of companies 
(Ali-Yrkkö and Maliranta, 2006).  The opposite is the case in post-communist countries. Their 
R&D intensity targets are smaller than the EU28 average (except Slovenia and Estonia) but at 
the same time there are greater challenges   for these countries because they are further away 
from achieving them. According to the European Commission Europe 2020 targets, in 2011 
Finland and Sweden required progress of only 6% and 19%, respectively (when expressed as 
percent of current R&D intensity value) in order to meet their R&D intensity targets. In 
contrast, for transition economies the figures to achieve their 2020 targets were: Romania, 
315%: Bulgaria, 163%; Poland, 122%: Latvia, 115%; Lithuania, 107%; Croatia, 87%; 
Slovakia, 77% and; Hungary, 49%.  Estonia (26% of progress required) and Slovenia (21% of 
progress required) were in a better situation (DG Research and Innovation). So on the one 
hand there is a big challenge ahead for many CE countries and on the other hand there are still 
only very few empirical studies on R&D in post-transition countries to shed a light on a 
prospectus impact of that increase in R&D. This paper therefore contributes to filling this 
important gap. 
                                                 




Fig. 1. R&D intensities in 2011 and targets for 2020 
Source: European Commission: Europe 2020 Targets 
In all post-communist countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia) Structural Funds from EU have become 
a significant, if not the main, source of public R&D funding In terms of policy instruments 
they are partly public expenditures (e.g. on research projects, patents and research institutions) 
and partly various types of government support (e.g. tax incentives, investment subsidies). 
The proper policy mix in order to achieve the intensity targets is the main policy challenge 
because there is usually a trade-off between the cost and the outcome of the policy, as we 
show in our paper. 
Therefore, the paper investigates the impact on macroeconomic variables and differences 
in transmission mechanism (via price changes) in case of R&D expansion through two fiscal 
mechanisms: public R&D expenditures and government R&D tax relief, separately. The 
model simulations are designed so that the target for Poland of 1.7% of R&D in GDP is 
achieved by either of the two instruments. Then their impact on economy is compared.  To 
our knowledge, R&D expenditures and R&D tax relief have not been explicitly compared in 
one paper for a transition economy yet. Therefore our paper provides useful information to 
assist the future planning of R&D expansion. 
A further advantage of the paper is that R&D spillovers are modelled with an explicit link 
to productivity, which is often ignored in studies – either due to lack of data or due to choice 
of a method which does not allow for endogenous productivity changes. In our study the link 
between R&D and productivity is treated explicitly within a recursive dynamic Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model, i.e. the growth rate of productivity is calculated as a ratio 
of return on R&D stock relative to output. 
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The specific case analyzed here is Poland, the largest post-communist economy in 
Europe. It is the first study on R&D for Poland which uses a country specific CGE model. 
The approach adopted has three distinct advantages over other methods.  First, in contrast to 
the I-O model approach to R&D proposed by Brautzsch (2015), the applied CGE model 
brings in economic theory and allows the macroeconomic environment to be specified for the 
analyses by defining model closure. Second, in contrast to the system of models approach to 
R&D as proposed by Varga (2011) for studies at the regional and the EU macroeconomic 
levels, this paper keeps R&D within one model.  Finally in contrast to the RHOMOLO 
approach (Brandsma and Kancs, 2015) which uses one model for all EU countries, this paper 
proposes a country specific model for Poland (POLTERM).  
The main innovations of this paper lie in applying a recursive dynamic computable 
general equilibrium model specifically developed for Poland, taking into account its post-
transition nature (in parameters and assumptions) with implicit links between R&D stock and 
productivity growth, and comparing economic effects of two separate policy instruments 
which would enable Poland to achieve its R&D intensity target by 2020. 
The paper is structured as follows. The second section provides a conceptual framework, 
which describes the R&D policy of the European Union, gives a brief summary of Poland’s 
situation in the R&D area and reviews previous studies on the links between R&D and 
productivity. The third section explains the model, data and simulation scenarios applied in 
the analysis whilst the fourth section presents the results and their robustness. In the fifth and 
final section we discuss the theoretical and practical conclusions from our findings and 
consider the pathways for further research. 
2 Conceptual framework  
2.1 European Union's R&D policy 
The European Union's research and development (R&D) policy, like other EU policies, is 
based on objectives stated in the Treaties of the European Union which are the documents that 
create the EU’s constitutional basis. In the last few decades R&D has grown considerably in 
importance and now receives significant political attention, due to its role in developing 
innovations and, as a result, in growth and socio-economic development. The main official 
documents in this area are two successive EU’s strategies: the Lisbon Strategy (the Lisbon 
Agenda, the Lisbon Process) and Europe 2020. The Lisbon Strategy was a development plan 
adopted in 2000 with a 10-year perspective. Its aim was to make the European Union "the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable 
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economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion". One of the targets 
set by the Strategy was that average spending on R&D across the EU was to reach at least 3% 
of GDP by the end of 2010. This goal was not achieved: across the EU-27 the overall 
spending on R&D had increased but only from 1.8% cent in 2000 to about 2.0% in 2010. 
Under these circumstances another strategic 10-year document – Europe 2020 – was devised 
in 2010. Its main aim was "smart, sustainable, inclusive growth" for the EU. The strategy kept 
the target of at least 3% of GDP to be spent on research and development as set in the earlier 
Lisbon strategy. However, this time the European wide target was translated into national 
goals. The reasons for this differentiation were the fact that the EU member states were 
starting from very diverse points in terms of R&D expenditures levels and that their economic 
systems were highly differentiated. The 2020 national targets vary from 0.5% in the case of 
Cyprus up to 4% for Finland and Sweden. For Poland the target value of overall spending on 
R&D is 1.7% of GDP, nearly half that of the EU average. 
2.2 State of  R&D in Poland 
Poland is still less economically developed than Western European countries. Despite the 
fact that in recent years Poland has performed remarkably well in terms of GDP growth (as 
compared to its European counterparts) it is commonly argued that the country faces the 
significant risk of the middle-income trap (Radło and Ciesielska, 2013). The main reason for 
this being the low levels of innovativeness within the Polish economy (Geodecki et al., 2012; 
Pruchnik and Toborowicz, 2014). The unsatisfactory level of Polish innovativeness is already 
well diagnosed (see e.g. Piekut, 2013) and has been targeted by public policy (mainly through 
EU programmes), but there has been no substantial improvement so far (European Union, 
2015). The low innovativeness of the Polish economy has its roots far back into decades and 
even centuries (Sulmicki and Czyżewska, 2011; Hryniewicz, 2004) and is seen as a complex 
issue. The low R&D/GDP ratio can be seen as a manifestation of a low innovativeness. In 
2013 total intramural R&D expenditures (GERD) constituted just 0.87%2 of Polish GDP, far 
less than the EU28 average of almost 2%. There are many important factors influencing this 
disadvantageous situation of the Polish economy. Among others, these include : low private 
funding of R&D (in 2013 32.3% of GERD funds in Poland came from business enterprise 
sector, whereas the EU28 average was 55%); a low number of mid-tech and high-tech 
enterprises interested  in developing their own technologies; relatively low FDI inflow into 
R&D as compared to for example the Czech Republic and Hungary (Owczarczuk 2013); 
                                                 
2 According to the updated Polish IO tables this ratio was higher 1.02%.  
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under developed collaboration between science and industry (Łącka, 2012); thepoor state of 
technology transfer (Jasinski, 2009); insufficient human resources in R&D sector (Dąbrowa-
Szefler, 2004) in part due to the ‘brain drain’ during the transition period (Jałowiecki and 
Gorzelak, 2004); low internationalization of scientific activities (Płoszaj and Olechnicka 
2015) and; high regional disparities in R&D quantity and quality (Olechnicka and Płoszaj, 
2010). 
The Polish R&D sector has been constantly reformed since the early nineties, which is 
after the collapse of the communist bloc. The changes accelerated after Poland’s accession to 
the European Union in 2004. The most important strategic decision was to transform the 
financial mechanism of public funding for research and development, from so-called statutory 
funds (earmarked subsidies) towards an increase in the number of open calls. Open 
competitions are managed mainly by two newly established institutions: National Center for 
Research and Development (2007) responsible for applied research and the National Science 
Centre (2011) responsible for basic research. The role of the Ministry of Science and Higher 
Education is mainly regulatory and strategic, however it also distributes limited resources via 
open competitions. The second important factor shaping the state of R&D sector in Poland is 
the large inflow of funding from European Union funds. The additional funds have been 
allocated in large part to build new infrastructure, including new buildings for universities and 
scientific institutes. The third essential feature of Polish R&D policy is the underuse of tax 
instruments by the firms. So called “relief on the acquisition of new Technologies” was in 
place from 2005 to 2015. The instrument provides an opportunity for the deduction from the 
income tax base of expenditures incurred due to the acquisition of new technologies. The 
effects of the measure were unsatisfactory mainly because of the low number of enterprises 
that took advantage of it. For example, in 2013 only 106 enterprises used the instrument 
(Kluzek 2015) and the tax reduction associated with their activities constituted only about 
0.4% of total R&D expenditures in Poland.  Part of the reason for the failure of the measure 
was a result of its low attractiveness for enterprises as compared to similar measures used in 
other countries (Kluzek 2013). This was due to too restrictive rules. One problematic rule was 
a requirement of acquisition of externally produced technology to get the tax relief, the other 
rule denied the costs associated with own R&D, such as wages of research personnel, to be 
deducted from the tax. Another reason may have been that the measure excluded costs 
associated with in-house R&D activities. Because of extremely low interest in that measure, 
the new one - R&D tax relief - was developed and it came into force in January 2016. 
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It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the reform and investments from EU funds. 
However, so far the effects have not been as large as expected (see e.g. Gorzelak 2014). There 
is still a need for a substantial increase in public investment in the R&D sector. There is an 
expectation in Poland that an increase in public spending should also boost private R&D 
investment. However the evidence supporting this contention is somewhat ambiguous – see 
e.g. Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). 
2.3 Approaches to analyze R&D 
R&D activity is perceived as a key driver of technological advance, leading, therefore, to 
an increase in productivity which, in turn, translates into faster economic growth. As such, it 
is a topic of intensive research examining ways to measure and optimize its impact on 
economy. A comprehensive review of key concepts, issues and theories related to the 
quantitative analysis of R&D effects is provided by Shanks and Zheng (2006) in their study 
on modelling the link between R&D and Australia’s productivity. 
The first challenge faced by researchers is that the primary output of R&D is knowledge, 
an intangible asset that cannot be directly measured or valued. Sometimes they quantify it as a 
number of patents issued but from economical point of view this measure is far from ideal, 
since it says nothing about the value of knowledge produced. More common approach then is 
to use data on R&D expenditures as a rough equivalent of the outputs generated (Shanks and 
Zheng, 2006). However, this measure is accurate without any adjustments only if we assume 
that productivity of R&D is constant (Shanks and Zheng, 2006). Productivity may be 
analyzed in relation to absolute R&D expenditures or R&D intensity (proportion of 
expenditures to GDP). 
Economists use a wide variety of models to analyze the relationships between knowledge 
development and economic growth. For example, neo-classical growth models assume that 
technological advance is an external factor which has no explicit link to knowledge 
development. The opposite approach is represented by evolutionary models that focus on 
technological trajectories and long cycles in technological opportunities. However, they are 
not well-established in terms of the empirical explanation of economic performance. Another 
important category comprises computable general equilibrium (CGE) models based on 
endogenous growth theory pioneered by Romer (1990). They are commonly used to assess 
the economic impact of different policy interventions. CGE models avoid a critique made by 
Garau and Lecca (2015) that typical Keynesian models with fixed nominal wage and excess 
labor supply, such as input–output models, are not well-suited for this type of analysis. For 
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example, they would omit supply-side effects in the case of an exogenous increase in 
investment which is a supply-side policy. Hong et al. (2014) proved that R&D-based CGE 
models that include knowledge stock as an additional primary input factor and allows for 
changes in TFP explains the performance of the economy better than standard two-factor 
models. In transition economies the country-level analysis may overestimate the role of R&D 
in TFP growth, as aggregate productivity improvement due to fundamental structural changes 
may be erroneously ascribed to TFP growth from R&D (Mericul, Poltimae, Paas, 2013). 
In 2008 the United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC) introduced a new version of 
the System of National Accounts in which expenditures on R&D are treated as investments. 
This poses a challenge in estimating R&D stock depreciation rate – a parameter required to 
calculate the R&D stock by perpetual inventory method. As Nadiri and Prucha (1996) note, 
many researchers assume an arbitrary depreciation rate of 10 to 15% although several 
attempts have been made to determine this parameter in a scientific way. According to 
Schankerman and Pakes (1986) who examined data on patent renewal fees, the decay rate for 
knowledge capital in some European countries varies between 11 and 36%. Nadiri and Prucha 
(1996) measured the depreciation rate of the R&D stock using a factor requirements function 
and a restricted cost function which resulted in a figure of 12% for the total U.S. 
manufacturing sector. Bernstein and Mamuneas (2005) used an intertemporal cost 
minimization framework to conclude that R&D depreciation rates for four main U.S. 
industries varied between 18 and 29%. From this, it is possible to draw the general conclusion 
that R&D stock depreciation rates are at least two times higher than those of physical capital. 
Another key parameter is the rate of return on R&D investments. The estimates of this 
rate of return are sensitive to the level of aggregation. A vast literature summarized by 
Griliches (1991) and Jones and Williams (1998) concerning mainly US industries at a 
relatively fine level of aggregation (four-digit) points to a rate of return to R&D of about 30%. 
Estimates by Griffith et al. (2004) on a panel of two-digit manufacturing industries covering 
OECD countries are more than twice as high as this. Econometric work undertaken by the 
Australian Industry Commission (1995) found that overall Australian R&D yielded a rate of 
return to the economy of between 50 and 60%. Attempts to assess the rate of return to R&D 
for developing or transition economies are relatively scarce and limited to firm-level studies, 
hence providing estimates on private rather than social rates of return to R&D. For example, 
Damijan, Jaklic and Rojec (2005) estimate the private rate of return to R&D in Slovenia at 
24%. However, higher estimates, around 31%, were obtained by Kolasa (2008) for Poland. 
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Existing studies regarding the impact of R&D on productivity show inconsistent results. 
Shanks and Zheng (2006), in spite of applying various models, describe their empirical 
estimates of the effects of R&D on Australian productivity as unreliable. According to 
Botazzi and Peri (2007) the elasticity of domestic knowledge generation, measured by the 
number of patents issued, to R&D employment in 15 OECD countries varies between 0.304 
and 0.786. Varga et al. (2011) presented a Geographic Macro and Regional model for NUTS-
2 regions of the Euro zone (GMR-Europe) consisting of three sub-models and designed to 
assess policy instruments introduced to support the development of knowledge economies. 
Analysis based on this model suggests that the elasticity of patenting with respect to R&D 
exceeds one on average in the Euro zone. In attempting to explain factors that stimulated TFP 
growth in the Polish economy from 2005 to 2013 Świeczewska (2015) applied a neoclassical 
approach that starts with an aggregate two-factor production. She found that all explanatory 
variables were statistically significant with a TFP elasticity with respect to the stock of 
domestic knowledge estimated at 0.032.  
There are many studies designed to evaluate the effects of R&D subsidies, especially 
those sourced from EU funds. Brautzsch et al. (2015), using a standard input-output model, 
came to the conclusion that R&D subsidies counteracted the effects of economic crises to 
some extent. However, they focused on Germany, so their findings may not be relevant to 
transition countries, such as Poland. To assess the European Union’s R&D policies, 
Brandsma and Kancs (2015) developed a spatial computable general equilibrium (SCGE) 
approach called RHOMOLO. In their paper they refer to other, firm-level, studies in which 
the estimated elasticity of TFP with respect to R&D investments varied between 0.01 and 
0.32. In the course of analysis covering 267 NUTS-2 EU regions they predicted potential 
policy-induced GDP growth effects of 0.01 to 2.75% above the baseline. They also show that 
the maximum estimated increase in productivity is larger than the maximum simulated GDP 
increase. Křístková (2012) estimated the impact of R&D activities, including external shocks, 
on the long-term economic growth of the Czech Republic within a recursively dynamic CGE 
framework. Her simulation shows that increasing foreign investment resources for R&D can 
lead to a higher GDP level at the end of the analyzed period but the gain is surprisingly small 
– only 1%. 
These findings suggest that the relationship between R&D and productivity is highly 
context-sensitive making it difficult to generalize. Therefore, each new piece of research can 
make a valuable contribution to the existing stock of knowledge in this area. 
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3 Methodology and data 
3.1 POLTERM model and R&D data 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have proved, both in theory and in 
practice, to be a sophisticated and practical method for economic impact analyses of R&D. 
This is mainly due to their ability to link R&D with productivity and economic growth within 
a consistent theoretical framework and producing computable results. Hence we apply in our 
study POLTERM, an implementation of the standard TERM model (by Horridge et al., 2005) 
to the Polish economy (Zawalińska, Giesecke, Horridge, 2013) at the national level. The 
TERM model has gained its reputation over the years due to many scientific publications, 
policy applications and its detailed documentation (Horridge, 2012; Horridge and Wittwer, 
2010)3. The theoretical structure of TERM follows the familiar neoclassical pattern common 
to many applied general equilibrium models. In this study we use the modernized, updated 
and recursive dynamic version of POLTERM. The dynamic mechanisms include equations 
relating investment to capital in year-to-year simulations; equations explaining the 
relationship between year-to-year capital growth and rate-of-return expectations; and 
equations explaining labor market adjustment. The theory is similar to that of the dynamic 
TERM model, which is described in detail in Wittwer (2012). In this paper we extend the 
model by treating R&D as investment into stock of knowledge and linking it to changes in 
productivity, as discussed in the next section.   
The main data source for the POLTERM model is the latest version of the Polish Input-
Output tables, especially the Supply and Use tables for 2010, issued by the Central Statistical 
Office of Poland in mid-2014 (GUS, 2014). Hence, the benchmark year for the model is 2010. 
For this study, the original I-O tables comprising 77 sectors were aggregated into 19 sectors4. 
The sectors are aggregated so as to coincide with the sections in the current European activity 
classification under the System of National Accounts (2008 SNA/NACE rev. 2).  The only 
exception is that section M is disaggregated into two incorporating R&D and the rest of 
section M.  By this process R&D is represented as a separate sector. It is important to note, 
                                                 
3 Details on TERM are provided at the model’s website: http://www.copsmodels.com/term.htm 
4Their short names are: 1. Agriculture, forestry and fishing (section A), 2. Mining and quarrying (section B), 3. 
Manufacturing (section C), 4. Electricity, gas, steam (section D), 5. Water supply, sewerage, waste (section E), 
6. Construction (section F), 7.  Wholesale and retail trade (section G), 8. Transporting and storage (section H), 9. 
Accommodation and food (section I), 10. Information and communication (section J), 11. Financial and 
insurance activities (Section K), 12. Real estate activities (section L), 13. Professional, scientific and technical 
activities (Section M without R&D), 14. Scientific Research and Development services (part of Section M), 15. 
Administration (section N), 16. Public administration and defense; compulsory social security (section O), 17. 
Education (section P), 18. Human health and social work (section Q), 19. Rest of services (sections R, S, T, U).   
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that in the previous classification (1993 SNA) R&D spending was treated in the input-output 
tables as a current expenditure that is used up in the production process, so it was mainly 
present as intermediate consumption. In contrast, the new 2008 SNA expands the range of 
fixed assets and shifts R&D spending into fixed-capital formation. That is why in our analysis 
R&D sectors are treated mainly as an investment good in the input-output tables. This 
methodological change in treating R&D within input-output tables triggered new studies on 
modelling R&D within CGE models (Hong et al. 2014).     
The database shows that in 2010 the R&D sector accounts for 0.48% of total production 
and 96.7% of total R&D expenditures in the economy. The sector sells about 66% of its 
output to other industries, 21.2% to government, 12.3% to exports, and 0.3% to households5. 
The country imports 3.3% of its R&D needs from abroad. 
3.2 Modelling R&D in POLTERM 
In POLTERM R&D expenditures by industry, government and households are treated as 
investment into the stock of knowledge. Following the method used by the American Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (Sliker, 2007; Bernat 2007), stock of knowledge is calculated using the 




where  and  are stock of R&D at the begininng and end of year t respectively, 
 is  R&D depreciation rate, and  is R&D expenditure during year t.  
 
Following the method used by Bernstein and Mamuneas (2006), we calculated the initial 
R&D stock for the initial year (  as the ratio of R&D expenditure in the year  to 
the sum of R&D depreciation rate and the average growth rate of R&D over some earlier 





The value for the initial R&D expenditure ( ) is obtained directly from the input-
output tables. We have adopted the value of 10% for the depreciation rate  ) which is 
consistent with the value adopted by many studies on R&D (Garau and Lecca, 2015: Keller, 
2004: Krammer, 2010). This value is higher than the average depreciation rate for physical 
capital in POLTERM (6.2%). This is however consistent with the finding from studies 
                                                 
5 The household sector in the model includes non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH). This is these 
institutions that use R&D services. 
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directly estimating R&D depreciation rates (see, for example, Bernstein and Mamuneas 2006) 
that R&D stock depreciates faster than physical capital stock. The growth rate of R&D stock 
( ) is the average growth rate between 2005 and 2010, which is 10.3% according to 
OECD (2012). 
The R&D stock is calculated as the sum of R&D stocks by industry, households and 
government6. 
We explicitly model the link between returns on R&D stock and total factor productivity. 
If we call KR&D and RoRR&D the stock and rate of return on R&D stock respectively, then the 





where  the growth rate of GDP at factor costs. Representing GDP as a function of 
technology, labour and capital stock, i.e. Y=AF(L,K), the growth rate in GDP equals the 
growth rate of technology plus the share-weighted average of growth rates of labor and capital 




where the dot above the variables represent their growth rates, and SL and SK are shares 
of labor and capital stock respectively in GDP at factor costs. When the change in GDP is due 
to the change in technology alone, we have = , and the growth rate in TFP can be calculated 





Estimates for the rate of return on R&D stock ( ) in the literature vary from 8.0 to 
170.0% (Brandsma and Kancs, 2015: Mairesse and Sassenou M., 1991: Pakes and 
Schankerman, 1978). Kolasa (2008) estimated the private rate of return to R&D in Poland of 
above 30%, but as Meriküll et al. (2013) pointed out, in transition economies the country-
level analysis may overestimate TFP growth and the role of R&D in it, as aggregate TFP 
growth due to changes in industry structure may be erroneously ascribed to TFP growth due 
to R&D. Therefore, we have adopted a more conservative value of 25%. 
Studies linking R&D and productivity sometimes use the elasticity of TFP with regard to 
R&D stock instead of the returns on R&D stock used in this paper. For comparison, we have 
                                                 
6 We do not count the exports of R&D services as investment in R&D stock. This is because R&D exports are 
likely to add to the stock of knowledge by foreign countries, and not directly to the stock of knowledge in the 
domestic economy.   
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calculated the elasticity resulting from our method. The elasticity is not constant, because in 
equation (5) above the numerator and denominator on the right hand side of the equation 
would change in different ways. R&D capital stock movements depend on the level of R&D 
investment, whereas GDP movements depend both on changes in the TFP itself and on 
changes in capital stock and employment, which in turn depend on many factors apart from 
changes in R&D stock. However, on average, our simulation results show that the elasticity 
varies between 0.02 to 0.06, which is within the estimated range in the studies by 
Świeczewska (2015) and Madden et al. (2001). 
3.3 Simulation scenarios for R&D policies  
The Europe 2020 strategy has set a target for R&D expenditures to GDP ratio for Poland 
of 1.7% by 2020.  To reach this level from the 2014 level of 1.07%, the ratio will need to 
increase on average by 7.99% per annum over the period 2015 to 2020.  Whilst in theory there 
are a number of ways to achieve the overall target, in this paper we explore just two possible 
policy instruments as these are the only two currently available in Poland. Policy 1 is to 
increase government demand for R&D services (e.g. research programs and grants available 
for public and private institutions). Policy 2 is to provide R&D tax relief for enterprises. 
To compare the efficacy of these policies, two simulations with POLTERM for the period 
2011-2025 were run. Going beyond the 2020 deadline enables investigation not only of the 
short-run but also the long-run impacts of the R&D targeting policies. The simulations are run 
in two stages. First, a baseline (business-as-usual) forecast was produced for the 2011-2025 
period. This forecast includes available forecasts for the economy, but excludes the effects of 
the R&D targeting policies. The second stage involved the development of two policy 
forecasts for the same period, one for each of the policies listed above. Each policy forecast 
includes the shocks underpinning the aforementioned baseline forecast, but with the addition 
of a shock describing the R&D targeting policy. We report results for each of the policies as 
time paths of percentage deviations in the values of variables in each policy forecast away 
from their values in the baseline forecast. 
In each of the policy simulations we exogenize the R&D/GDP ratio and shock it with the 
values calculated for each year during the period 2015-2020 at a constant growth rate of 
7.94% discussed above so as to reach the target of 1.7% by 2020, and then maintain it at that 
level by 2025 (see Fig. 2). We endogenize the variable representing the policy under 
consideration so as to force the model to find the changes in the policy that are required to 
reach the R&D/GDP target. Specifically, for Policy 1 we endogenize government demand for 
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R&D services. For Policy 2 we endogenize the consumption tax on R&D uses by domestic 
businesses. Changes in those policy instruments are reported in Fig 2. 
Simulation results show that by 2020 the government would have to increase its level of 
expenditures on domestic R&D by 300% compared with baseline. The share of R&D in total 
government consumption expenditures increases from 1.1% in 2014 to 4% in 2020. 
Afterwards, the expenditures change at a relatively low rate (see Fig.2). 
 
Fig. 2. Changes in R&D/GDP ratio and in policy instruments (Level for R&D/GDP target, % 
deviations from baseline for government expenditures; and deviations in the rate of tax relief for R&D 
expenditure) 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on POLTERM model. 
In the scenario where the government provide tax relief to businesses, simulation results 
show that the rate of tax relief on the production of R&D services will have to be from 98.9% 




This section discusses the results from our policy simulations. First we discuss the main 
impacts of each of the alternative policies, then we compare them in terms of their impacts on 
GDP and government budget.  
4.1 R&D target achieved by government R&D expenditures (Policy 1) 
The first impact of an increase in government expenditures on R&D is to increase demand for 
R&D services. This raises the price and output of R&D. As a back-of-the-envelope (BOTE) 
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calculation, by 2020 government consumption of domestic R&D increases by 268% relative 
to the baseline. In 2014 the government consumes 20% of R&D output. The 268% increase in 
government consumption alone would cause R&D output to rise by about 53.6%. This almost 
entirely explains the 54.1% increase in R&D output.7 Employment in the sector increases, 
while higher rates of return triggers investment, leading eventually to an increase in capital 
stock. The dominant impact of the policy is the increase in R&D stock, which leads to an 
increase in productivity for the whole economy. This, in turn, causes GDP to rise. By 2020 
the deviation of real GDP from baseline is 0.38%. Fig. 3 reports simulation results for GDP 
income components. As can be seen from the figure, the increase in real GDP is mainly due to 
the increase in productivity induced by R&D stock accumulation. 
During the 2015 to 2020 period the increase in real GDP is slightly lower than that of 
productivity. This is because there is a slight negative deviation in capital stock due to two 
main reasons. First, with a constant average propensity to consume, defined as a ratio of 
nominal final consumption (C+G) to nominal GDP, the rise in government consumption due 
to its increased expenditures on R&D causes a fall in private consumption. As private 
consumption is more capital intensive than government consumption, a fall in private 
consumption causes capital stock to fall relative to baseline. Second, we have assumed that 
aggregate employment stays at the baseline level. The expansion of the R&D sector attracts 
labor away from other industries, causing marginal products of capital in these industries to 
fall. This lowers their rates of return, and hence their investment, and subsequent capital stock 
fall. However, as can be seen from Fig. 3, these effects on capital stock are very small. 
In the long run, after the R&D target has been reached, the above effects become much 
smaller, and the improvement in productivity raises the marginal product of capital stock and 
labour in all sectors, causing aggregate capital stock to increase. Together, the increase in 
capital stock and productivity, as well as in the wagebill-weighted employment, causes real 
GDP to continue to grow, reaching 3.1% higher than the baseline by 2025. 
                                                 
7 As discussed earlier, simulation results for variables are deviations from their values in the baseline forecast. 
For brevity, we sometimes use a “rise” or an “increase” to indicate a positive deviation from baseline, and a 




g. 3. Policy 1 – GDP income components, government expenditures on R&D and R&D 
output (% deviations from baseline) 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on POLTERM model. 
4.2 R&D target achieved by the provision of tax relief on R&D expenditure 
(Policy 2) 
In this section we explore the impacts of a tax relief on the expenditure on R&D by 
domestic businesses. As discussed earlier, simulation results show that the tax relief rates will 
have to increase to approximately 100% by 2020 to reach the R&D intensity target. Fig. 4 
reports the percentage deviations of R&D output and GDP and its income components from 





Fig. 4. Policy 2 – R&D output and contributions of GDP income components to GDP 
(% deviations from baseline) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on POLTERM model. 
 
The first impact of the tax relief policy is to reduce the costs of R&D investment for 
industry. This increases industry demand for R&D services. This explains the large positive 
deviations in R&D output, which reaches 55.1% above the baseline by 2020. However, in the 
first year real GDP experiences a small negative deviation of -0.06% from baseline. This is 
mainly due to the decline in indirect tax revenues caused by the large tax relief. In 2015, 
indirect tax revenues falls 8.8% compared with baseline. Indirect taxes contribute about 12% 
of Poland’s GDP. The fall of 8.8% in tax revenues should have led to a 1.1% decline in real 
GDP. However, real GDP declines by only 0.06%. This is due to the positive contribution 
from productivity, capital stock and labor. The increase in R&D expenditure increases the 
stock of knowledge and generates improvements in productivity. Productivity contributes 
directly to GDP, but also improves the marginal products of capital stock and labor, so capital 
stock increases. As employment levels are assumed to stay at the baseline level, its 
contribution to GDP growth occurs via the increase in the real wage, but the contribution is 
small. From 2016 onwards the positive contributions from technology, capital stock and 
employment become larger than the negative impact of indirect tax revenues. Real GDP 




At the industry level, the results are quite similar to those found with Policy 1. The R&D 
sector expands the most (see Fig. 4), with output deviating 55% by 2020 and 70% by 2025 
from the baseline. However, the impacts on other sectors are more positive than those in 
Policy 1. In aggregate, only in 2016 do they experience a small contraction of -0.06% in their 
outputs. From 2017 onwards the sectors grow, reaching deviations of 1.06% and 3.95% above 
baseline in 2020 and 2025, respectively. The reason for the more positive outcomes for other 
industries under Policy 2 is that, although they also experience resource-allocation impacts 
from the fast growth of the R&D sector as in Policy 1, they do not experience the negative 
impacts of an increase in R&D price as in Policy 1. On the contrary, they experience a fall in 
the price of R&D due to the tax relief policy.   
4.3 Achieving R&D target by different policy instruments 
Fig. 5 compares the impacts on real GDP and the impacts on government budget under 
the two policies. It is clear that the policy of tax relief leads to a higher positive GDP 
deviation from the baseline (0.85% in 2020 and 3.71% in 2025) than the policy of increasing 
government expenditures on R&D, where deviation from the baseline is respectively 0.38% in 
2020 and 3.10% in 2025. However, the tax relief policy is also much more costly to the 
budget. In the government expenditures scenario the change in the value of government 
expenditures on R&D compared with that in the baseline increases almost linearly from PLN8 
2bn in 2015 to PLN 12.6bn in 2020, and then up to PLN 16.4bn in 2025 at 2014 prices.  
 
                                                 
8 PLN, is the abbreviation for the Polish national currency the Polish Zloty, where 4 PLN ≈ 1 EUR. 
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Fig. 5. Real GDP (% deviation from baseline) and government budget outlays (PLN 
billion change from baseline) under alternative policies 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on POLTERM model. 
 
The total present value of the increase in government expenditures, discounted at 5% pa, 
is PLN 33.9bn for the period 2015-2020. At the same time, in the tax relief scenario the 
budgetary outlays increases from PLN 17.9bn in 2015 to PLN 32.8bn in 2020 and to PLN 
40.9bn in 2025. The present value of the subsidies, discounted at 5% pa, is PLN 129.9bn for 
the period 2015-2020. 
 
So the tax relief policy is superior to the government expenditure policy in terms of the 
impacts on GDP, both in the short run and the long run, but it is inferior in terms of the direct 
costs on the government budget. So in comparing the two policies, the question arises which 
of them is more efficient in terms of achieving the same R&D target with a lower output/input 
ratio, where output is measured as real GDP growth (above the baseline) and input as the 
budgetary cost of achieving it. In other words, which of the two policies buys the additional 
increase in GDP growth for less. Tab. 1 compares the ratio for the two policies over the time 




Table 1 Approximate efficiency of R&D policies      
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
1/ R&D target 1.16 1.25 1.35 1.46 1.57 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70
2/  Budgetary outlays in billion PLN (above baseline) :
Government expenditure (Policy  1) 2.0           2.9             5.4             7.1             10.0          12.6          12.2          14.0          14.3          15.6          16.4          
Tax relief  (Policy 2) 17.9         20.3          22.9          25.8          29.0          32.8          32.7          35.6          36.7          39.1          40.9          
3/ Real GDP % change (above the baseline):
Government expenditure (Policy  1) -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.17 0.38 0.72 1.16 1.71 2.36 3.10
Tax relief  (Policy 2) -0.06 0.10 0.27 0.44 0.63 0.85 1.30 1.75 2.34 2.97 3.71
4/ Efficiency ratios (3 /2 )
Government expenditure (Policy  1) -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.19
Tax relief  (Policy 2) -0.003 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09  
Source: Authors’ own calculations   
 
Tab.2 shows that the efficiency ratio has been changing over time for both policies. At the 
beginning of the period the tax relief policy had a slightly higher efficiency. By 2020, 
however, the efficiency of the two policies was equal (0.03) and beyond 2020 (in the long 
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run) the government expenditure policy brings greater value for money.  By 2025 the 
efficiency ratio is quite markedly higher for the government expenditure policy being 0.19 
compared to 0.09.   
 
4.4 Robustness of the results 
Since our analyses was based on some key assumptions on R&D taken from literature, 
such as the rate of return on R&D stock ( ) and the R&D depreciation rate ( ), a 
Systematic Sensitivity Analysis (SSA) was carried out with respect to those two parameters9. 
The confidence intervals were developed using Chebyshev’s inequality, since it does not 
require any assumptions to be made about the distribution of the endogenous variables. 
Chebyshev's inequality says that, whatever the distribution of the variable in question, for 
each positive real number k, the probability that the value of Y does not lie within k standard 
deviations of the mean M is no more than 1/(k2). As a result, obtained confidence intervals 
are wider than they would be if we knew more about the distribution of the endogenous 
variables (or if we assume a normal distribution). So this is a cautious approach and the 
obtained intervals are probably wider than the actual ones.10  
Gaussian quadrature - Stroud's quadrature of order 3 – are used for calculating 
estimates of the means and standard deviations of the endogenous variables produced by the 
software utilized for this study – GEMPACK. It uses a Gaussian quadrature to select a 
discrete approximation to the actual (continuous) distribution we have specified for the values 
of the varying parameters. The model is then solved only at the points of this discrete 
distribution, and the means and standard deviations reported are those for this discrete 
distribution. Hence the results reported are approximations to the true means and standard 
deviations. However, as examples in Arndt (1996) show, the results are often surprisingly 
accurate, given the relatively modest number of times the model is solved11.  
We undertook SSA for 30% of the variation in the parameter  (rate of return on 
R&D stock or RoR_RD) so it was varied between 17.5 and 32.5%, while our adopted value 
was 25%. Similarly, we carried out SSA for 30% range of variation in  (R&D 
depreciation rate or DEPR_RD) so it was varied between 7% and 13%, while our adopted 
                                                 
9 See discussions on the SSA methodology and implementation in Channing (1996) and Channing and Pearson 
(2000).  
10 A proof of Chebyshev's inequality can be found in many statistics text books including Hogg and Craig 
(1970). 
11 In our case for rate of return on R&D stock ( ) the model was solved 736 times and for R&D depreciation 
rate ( ) it was solved 44 times. 
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value is 10%. We assumed triangular distribution, as the vales we have adopted have been 
chosen after careful considerations based on existing literature. We ran the SSA for both 
policy scenarios (R&D government expenditure and tax relief) and for each of the policies we 
varied the two parameters (RoR_RD and DEPR_RD) separately, and then also together to see 
the combined effect of our assumptions on the GDP results.  The results of the SSA indicate 
that we can be 95% confident that the values of real GDP obtained in our simulations for the 
two policies are within the ranges reported in fig. 6. 
 
Figure 6 SSA results of 95% confidence intervals for real GDP in 2020 under two 
policy scenarios wrt changes in RoR_RD (  ) and DEPR_RD ( ) 
Source: Authors’ own calculations made in GEMPACK 
 Sensitivity analysis suggests that the results of the simulation are quite robust 
with regard to the assumed values of both parameters. The results are, however, more 
sensitive to changes in RoR_RD than in DEPR_RD.  Despite some sensitivity to RoR 
variation, the SSA results indicate that the tax relief policy still brings higher real GDP 
effect to the economy than the government consumption policy. 
 
 
5 Discussion of the results and conclusions 
Poland has to achieve 1.7% level of R&D intensity by the year 2020 as required by the 
Europe 2020 strategy and then at least maintain this level into the future. However, this is a 
very challenging goal for a country which after about 50 years of communism was left with 
very outdated technologies and limited capacity for R&D absorption. There are only two 
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policy instruments implemented in Poland: government expenditures on R&D - in the form of 
various publicly financed grants and research programs – and tax relief for business on use of 
R&D activities. So far R&D tax relief has not been much used in practice, due to restrictive 
rules in place hampering access to this instrument. However, a new reform of the R&D tax, 
introduced in January 2016, is less restrictive and broadly welcomed by the private sector. 
Therefore, there is an expectation that tax relief will be the main driver of increasing of R&D 
intensity in Poland.  
However, benefits of policies must be considered in conjunction of their costs. Using a 
CGE framework, our paper consider costs and benefits of the two policies which are in place 
in Poland. Tax relief policy is indeed superior to the government expenditure policy in terms 
of the impacts on GDP, both in the short run and the long run, but it is inferior in terms of the 
direct costs on the government budget.  The present value of estimated government outlays 
needed to meet the R&D intensity target in the tax relief scenario is about 2.5 times higher 
than in the government expenditure scenario. Moreover, allocating additional public funds to 
the purchase of R&D services brings direct effects while tax relief stimulate R&D indirectly 
via lower prices. In both scenarios, the resulting increase in R&D capital stock translates into 
substantial improvement of productivity across the whole economy. This, in turn, leads to 
faster GDP growth than in the baseline scenario, and in the case of tax relief policy the GDP 
growth is indeed higher comparing to the other one, i.e. 0.85% vs 0.38% in 2020 (or 3.71% 
vs. 3.1% in 2025). However, the results reveal that tax relief is more efficient (in the sense 
that it is brings a higher GDP growth per unit of public money) only in the short run, up to 
2020. In the longer run government expenditure is more efficient, by 2025 it is even estimated 
to be twice as efficient as tax relief.  It can be concluded therefore that an optimal policy is a 
matter of a proper policy mix over a given period of time.  
   The present work opens a number of possibilities for future research. First of all, more 
detailed analysis of the impacts of private versus public sources of R&D expenditures on 
actual productivity growth can shed a better light on the analysis of the two policy 
instruments. Second, an international comparison of the two measures analyzed with 
analogical methodology would be very informative, especially with respect to other post-
transition economies. Third, the regional (sub-national) dimension could be brought into the 
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